Can Punishment Bring Peace? Penal Substitution Revisited by Holmes, Stephen Ralph
SJT 58(1): 104–123 (2005) Printed in the United Kingdom C© 2005 Scottish Journal of Theology Ltd
doi:10.1017/S0036930605000955
Can punishment bring peace? Penal substitution
revisited
Steve Holmes
School of Humanities, King’s College London, steve.holmes@kcl.ac.uk
Recently, I attended a conference on the theme ‘theologies of the cross’. I
gained much from it in various ways, but one feature concerned me: in
reading the papers, and listening to discussions, it became rather clear that,
whilst the various contributors might or might not agree, or even be sure
about, what they did believe about the cross, they were all both united
and certain on what they didn’t believe in – the traditional Reformed and
Evangelical idea of penal substitution.1 Now, I confess that I had no particular
commitment to this idea. I knew of no exegetical or theological reason to
demand that we hold on to it, or to suggest that our account of the atonement
would necessarily be lacking something vital if we did not express it in this
way. Penal substitution was a way of talking about the cross with which I was
familiar, but to which I was not committed. Temperamentally, I had tended
to avoid it: as far as I can judge, the dominant way of talking about the cross
in my preaching has been in terms of combat with, and victory over, the evil
powers of sin and death and hell; it is not a theme I have touched on much in
my academic writing. Penal ideas are common, however, in the liturgy and
(particularly) hymnody of my church tradition: ‘Bearing shame and scoffing
rude/In my place condemned he stood’; ‘All our pride, all our greed, all
our fallenness and shame, and the Lord has laid the punishment on him.’2 I
have never seen any reason to object to such songs. So, to be at a conference
where there was near unanimity that, whatever else we were going to say
about the cross, we would begin by dismissing this tradition, was of interest
and concern to me.
1 Behind this paper lie some comments I made in the plenary session at the end of that
conference, and an email from Colin Gunton suggesting that I should write them up
into something publishable – a suggestion to which I had not replied when Colin
died so suddenly. Earlier versions of the paper were read at the Research Institute
in Systematic Theology seminar at King’s College, London; a Baptist theological
consultation at Regent’s Park College, Oxford, and the postgraduate seminar of
Spurgeon’s College. In each case I received helpful comment and criticism. In addition,
some comments on the paper by Dr. Mike Higton have helped me greatly to clarify
my thoughts.
2 Philipp Bliss, ‘Man of Sorrows’; Graham Kendrick, ‘Come and See’.
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I want, therefore, in this paper to offer a programmatic account of a
defence of this tradition through a series of steps. The first, and briefest,
step will be to sketch an account of what we are doing when we theologise
about the atonement. Next, I want to examine a classical statement of penal
substitution to demonstrate precisely what is or is not claimed in talking
about the cross this way; this will lead to a consideration of which of
the common criticisms offered are significant, and which are directed at
misreadings, and so can be safely dismissed. Then I will attempt defences
against the substantive criticisms that remain.
It is a commonplace of recent theological writing on the cross to consider
the various ways in which preachers, theologians, and even the Scriptures
talk about the mechanics of the atonement as a series of images, models or
metaphors that are valuable insofar as they manage to convey something of
the truth of what was going on at Calvary, but which are not meant to be
understood as literal mechanistic accounts of the event and its effects.3 The
event of the cross, it seems to me, is necessarily sui generis, and so to suggest
that any one of the traditional models is an accurate and full account of that
event must be wrong – this is not merely one, even the pre-eminent one,
in a series of inspirational acts of self-sacrifice, nor is it an illustration of
a more general principle of substitution or representation, whether that is
constructed in terms of an anthropological account of sacrifice or a legal
account of corporate responsibility. Rather, the cross is a single decisive
event that evades such categorisation precisely because it is so basic to any
properly theological account of the nature of true humanity, true justice,
true sacrifice, true relationship, or a host of other realities.4 Each model
illuminates something of that event, whilst simultaneously distorting it in
some way. They are, as Gunton says, metaphors, at once like and unlike the
thing which they describe. If penal substitionary language for the atonement
is defensible, it will be in these terms and not others.
3 For instance, Colin E. Gunton, The Actuality of Atonement: A Study of Metaphor, Rationality and
the Christian Tradition (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988); see especially pp. 27–52, where
Gunton defends the use of ‘metaphor’ to describe the different atonement theories. The
point is general, although the precise terminology adopted varies: Paul S. Fiddes, Past
Event and Present Salvation: The Christian Idea of Atonement (London: DLT, 1989) uses the word
‘images’; F. W. Dillistone, The Christian Understanding of Atonement (London: SCM, 1968)
uses ‘analogues’ and ‘parables’; John McIntyre, The Shape of Soteriology (Edinburgh: T&T
Clark, 1992) offers ‘models’. This list is very far from exhaustive.
4 See my God of Grace and God of Glory: An Account of the Theology of Jonathan Edwards (Edinburgh:
T&T Clark, 2000), pp. 163–4 for some discussion of this point.
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Penal substitution: towards a restatement
It is often asserted that there is no clear statement of penal substitution in the
Scriptures. I think this assertion is open to challenge,5 but for the purposes
of this paper, I will simply accept it. This is not yet a good reason not to
use an account of penal substitution to describe and illuminate what goes
on at Calvary. Under the guidance of the Spirit, the Church has chosen to
express its beliefs about God’s tri-personal existence, and about the unity of
true humanity and true divinity in the person of Christ, using conceptual
schemes that are not found in Scripture, but are rather borrowed from the
Academy of Athens and adapted to be of service; what good theological
reason can be advanced to suggest that the Roman law court could not
furnish a similar conceptual scheme for describing the atonement, assuming
that one can be found which (with appropriate adjustment) can be put to
service?
Perhaps the classical statement of penal substitution comes in the writings
of John Calvin. Before examining what Calvin has to say, I want to look at
some of the antecedents of his account. It is worth noting explicitly that,
despite what is sometimes asserted by opponents of the scheme, Anselm’s
account in Cur Deus Homo cannot properly be described as penal substitution.6
The conceptual motor there is not punishment due as a result of a failure
to obey legislation; instead, Anselm’s scheme adapts feudal accounts of the
honour due from a vassal to a liege-lord, and the satisfaction offered is
a way of making good the honour that was due.7 It is explicitly not a
punishment: Anselm poses the famous dilemma aut poena aut satisfactio precisely
to indicate that, within his conceptual scheme, the idea of God punishing
sin is unthinkable, as it would indicate that his project of creation had
5 Emil Brunner’s assertion indicates one way in which the discussion might proceed:
‘[t]wo series of statements of a parabolic nature determine the scriptural message
concerning the fact of the atonement: firstly, the parables which deal with the payment
of debts, which are taken from the practice of law, with their ideas of penalty and
satisfaction; and secondly, analogies drawn from the practice of the cultus, with their
emphasis upon the sacrifice and the shedding of blood’ (The Mediator, trans. Olive
Wyon (London: Lutterworth, 1937) p. 455). Again, John McIntyre comments ‘there
is strong prima facie support for the view that sacrifice and penalty are not to be separated
off from one another, the latter providing an essential element in the interpretation of
the former . . .’ (The Shape of Soteriology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1992), p. 44).
6 Paul Fiddes recognises this – see Past Event, p. 97.
7 I have written more fully on Anselm’s arguments in Cur Deus Homo in ‘The Upholding
of Beauty: A Reading of Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo’ Scottish Journal of Theology 54.2 (2001),
pp. 189–203, reprinted (with minor adjustments) as chapter 3 of my Listening to the
Past: The Place of Tradition in Theology (Carlisle: Paternoster, 2002).
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failed.8 That is, Anselm makes sense of the atonement through drawing
on the metaphor of the hierarchical ordering of his society, and the right
maintenance of that order. Arguably, Anselm’s account is not even properly
described as substitutionary, as the scheme only makes sense if the God-
man acts in solidarity with the whole of creation, rather than in its place.
Nonetheless, Anselm’s account lends itself to language of God’s majesty
being offended, if that language is carefully specified to take account of
God’s impassibility, and of a necessary satisfaction to meet the offence. It is
only a short step from here to penal substitution as Calvin formulated it. In
particular, Anselm, like Calvin, assumes that sin requires satisfaction – that
God cannot simply forgive, without some act of reparation taking place.9
The (often heated) denial of this premise is at the heart of many modern
objections to notions of penal substitution (as it was to Abelard’s response
to Anselm), and so Anselm’s arguments can be deployed to defend a central
feature of Calvin’s account, even though he deploys them to a different end.
A second background for Calvin’s account might be found in the strong
Biblical tradition of metaphors of sacrifice. Christ is the spotless lamb of God,
slain on behalf of the people of God so that the avenging angel might pass over
those whose households are marked with his blood, or he is the scapegoat
slain as an offering of atonement, with the sins of the people symbolically
laid on his head so that his death may mark their forgiveness. (In passing, it
is worth considering the question of whether the Old Testament sacrificial
system should be read as a typological prefiguring of Christ’s death. If this
were to be the case, then my initial comments about metaphor would need a
certain amount of nuancing, in that an account of the events of Calvary built
on sacrifice would be privileged in certain ways. Whilst I think typology has
more going for it as a method of Biblical exegesis than is usually allowed
these days, I see problems here. In particular, I suspect that the sustained
later critique of the sacrificial cult in the prophets and the wisdom literature
would make a straightforward typological privileging difficult.)
Some, at least, of these Biblical metaphors are explicitly substitutionary.
Consider, for example, Abraham, who ‘offered up [the ram] as a burnt
offering instead of his son’ (Gen. 22:13 NRSV; the Hebrew is thachath).
Famously, the theological logic of the sacrificial system demanded in the
pentateuchal law codes is somewhat opaque, but many recent commentators
8 See Cur Deus Homo I.xv, xix, xxv; also my Upholding of Beauty, p. 197 (art.)/44 (book).
9 On which see Cur Deus Homo I.xii, where Anselm offers three arguments to this end,
the first two turning on the concept of the ‘right ordering’ of the universe (quoniam
recte ordinare . . . ), which makes certain acts of God ‘unfitting’ (quod Deo non convenit); the
third on God’s faithfulness.
107
scottish journal of theology
suggest that it is best understood as substitutionary. Gordon Wenham,
for instance, asserts that ‘in giving the animal to God, the worshipper is
reminded that he should die for his sins had the animal not taken his
place’.10 Again, Erhard Gerstenberger describes ‘the ritual transfer of sin
through “hand leaning” [i.e., the worshipper’s placing of a hand upon the
sacrificial animal]’,11 and notes that kipper, ‘effecting atonement’, is a word
that occurs more times (50) in Leviticus than in the rest of the Old Testament
together (43 occurrences), which he suggests ‘proves the central significance
of propitiatory sacrificial practice at least for certain redactors of the priestly
tradition’.12 The text that is perhaps most pregnant with theological meaning
for describing the sacrificial system in the Pentateuch, Lev 17:11, asserts
that ‘the life of the flesh is in the blood; and I have given it to you for
making atonement for your lives on the altar; for, as life, it is the blood that
makes atonement’ (NRSV). Whilst not perhaps insisting on a life-for-life
substitution at the heart of the sacrificial system, the text certainly invites
that reading. The general account seems to suggest that: the committing of
sin somehow makes the sinner liable to certain consequences, as discussed
above; and that these consequences can somehow be turned aside through
the ritual transfer of the sin to a sacrificial animal, and the offering of its
blood/life to God.13
More interesting, perhaps, is the widespread exegetical agreement that
the sacrificial system presumes that sin causes some liability for punishment,
which cannot be passed over by God, but must somehow be turned away. This
is the Biblical basis for Anselm’s demand for satisfaction, or Calvin’s guilt that
cannot be ignored. So, for instance, John E. Hartley speaks of ‘the principle
of retribution, i.e., every sin is pregnant with its own consequences’.14
Gerstenberger traces a similar, but more personalised, conception: ‘[a]ny
10 Gordon J. Wenham, Numbers (Tyndale Old Testament Commentary) (Leicester: IVP, 1981),
p. 204. Wenham describes this reconstruction as ‘the most probable view’. In the
same discussion he quotes approvingly Leach’s Culture and Communion (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1976) as saying ‘The plain implication is that, in some
metaphysical sense, the victim is a vicarious substitution for the donor himself’
(p. 89). See further Wenham’s The Book of Leviticus (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1979).
11 Gerstenberger, Erhard S. Leviticus: A Commentary (trans. Douglas W. Stott) (Louisville, KT:
WJKP, 1996), p. 35.
12 Gerstenberger, Leviticus, p. 27.
13 On this see particularly N. Kiuchi, The Purification Offering in the Priestly Literature: Its Meaning and
Function (JSOTS Supp. Series 56) (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1987), passim, but
particularly pp. 101–9 and 162, where strong exegetical arguments for understanding
the sacrificial mechanism as explicitly substitutionary are developed.
14 Hartley, John E. Leviticus (Word Biblical Commentary) (Dallas, TX: Word, 1992),
p. lxxi.
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misdeed . . . provokes God’s anger . . . The deity is disturbed, enraged . . . The
deed represents not only a legal breach, but also an insult . . . Yahweh must
react as a person . . . condemnation thus does not emerge from any court
procedure . . . [but] as an almost “automatic” counterreaction on the part of
God . . .’15 Gerstenberger regards the use of sacrifice in turning aside such
divine anger as a ‘primitive’ conception (‘prehistoric notions of faith . . . [in
which] blood is considered to be a magical substance efficacious in and of
itself’.16 A. T. Hanson, in a fascinating consideration of Biblical accounts
of God’s wrath, suggests a development through the Old Testament period
from Gerstenberger’s primitive and personalised picture to a much more
impersonal principle or retribution, similar to Hartley’s account.17
I confess to being rather unconvinced by most such attempts to describe
this or that Old Testament theme as ‘primitive’. Partly, this is down to a
degree of scepticism about the confident assigning of this or that verse to
a particular, and datable, stage of redaction; more fundamentally, one does
not need a great knowledge of history to find the equation ‘older = more
primitive’ – and its implied converse, ‘newer = more advanced/civilised’ –
simply bizarre. That an ethical or theological conception was current ten
centuries before Christ is no proof that it is wrong, even before any account
of revelation or inspiration is deployed. The argument I will be developing
will, as it happens, follow the ‘impersonal’ line here, largely as a result of
some commitments learnt from Anselm concerning the doctrine of God, but
this is not as a result of any rejection of certain Biblical themes as ‘primitive’
so much as an exegetical and theological judgement. Still, sacrifice here is
understood as a necessary way of turning away the inevitable consequences
of sin, which are real and serious, and cannot just be waived.
I suggest, without having space to argue the point here, that the key
moment in the development of a penal account came when sacrificial pictures
no longer communicated meaningfully, and penal metaphors were available
and helpful. It may be that sacrificial images are the central way in which the
New Testament talks about the death of Christ, but in cultures (such as ours)
which have no tradition of sacrificial practice, such imagery seems merely
15 Gerstenberger, Leviticus, p. 57.
16 Gerstenberger, Leviticus, pp. 59–60; see also the discussion on pp. 60–1 as to why
such primitive ideas were revived in the post-exilic period when the final redaction
of Leviticus is presumed to have taken place.
17 Anthony Tyrrell Hanson, TheWrath of the Lamb (London: SPCK, 1957), pp. 1–40. Hanson
finds the Chronicler’s view of wrath to be almost wholly impersonal, in contrast to
some of the earlier strata of OT writings. In arguing for this development, he is slightly
embarrassed by the (unquestionably late, and highly personalised) apocalyptic passages
in the prophets.
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opaque. Even if we accept that the sacrifices of the Old Testament cultus were
intended as types of Christ’s death, and so that they have a privileged position
in its interpretation, still we are faced with two problems, one cultural, one
theological. The cultural problem is that sacrifice no longer means anything
to us today, and so we are faced with an analogous problem to the one
we have with the privileged Greek metaphysical accounts of the Trinity: we
might know what orthodoxy is, but it takes either sustained and patient
explanation, or a series of more immediately comprehensible supporting
metaphors, before it can be understood by anyone without considerable
specialised knowledge.
In non-sacrificial cultures, then, different imagery might be necessary to
explain or illuminate the events of Calvary, and I suggest that the rise of penal
accounts may be understood in these terms: they are a way of making sense
of the Biblical language of guilt- and sin-bearing substitutionary sacrifice in
a context where sacrifice itself is what has been called a ‘dead metaphor’.18
The fact that any examination of evangelical hymnody will demonstrate
how closely intertwined sacrificial and penal imageries are in that tradition
of spirituality, perhaps lending support to my thesis,19 as does Foucault’s
(and others’) recognition of the deeply ingrained ritualism of criminal
justice systems in the modern West.20 The running together of different
atonement metaphors like this is not inappropriate, of course: it is also
entirely characteristic of the New Testament texts, which famously pile their
18 This would particularly be the case if, as I suspect, sacrifice functions as a semiotic
event which cannot be reduced to words without losing something of its symbolic
logic. In this case, no amount of discussion of sacrificial systems can make sacrificial
metaphors live in a non-sacrificial culture in quite the way they did when first used.
The sensory experience – sight, sound, smell – of hot blood spurting from a fresh
knife wound communicates in a way that description of it, however powerful, cannot
replicate.
19 Consider Bliss’s stanza, quoted in part above: ‘Bearing shame and scoffing rude/In
my place condemned he stood/Sealed my pardon with his blood/Alleluia! What a
Saviour!’ The second line is unquestionably penal in its imagery: ‘condemned’ is
the language of the law court; the third, by contrast, with its emphasis on blood, is
more naturally read as sacrificial. The same feature, of the two images intertwining,
is common in the new evangelical hymnody as well: consider ‘I believe there is a
God in heaven who paid the price for all my sin/Shed his blood to open up the
way for me to walk with Him/Gave His life upon a cross/Took the punishment for
us/Offered up Himself in love/Jesus, Jesus’ (Dave Bilbrough) or ‘My condemnation
falls on Him./This love is marvellous to me,/His sacrifice has set me free’ (Graham
Kendrick).
20 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (trans. Alan Sheridan) (London: Allen Lane, 1977).
See also Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred (trans. Patrick Gregory) (London: John
Hopkins University Press, 1977), p. 21.
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images on top of one another in a sometimes bewildering profusion. This
intertwining of different images is also, finally, characteristic of John Calvin’s
accounts of the atonement, and so is the context in which a penal account
first comes to its fullest flower.21
The relevant chapters of the Institutes22 are II.xv–vii. II.xv treats of the
threefold office, which identifies the several parts of Christ’s saving work. As
prophet, Christ reveals to us all that is ‘worth knowing’ (II.xv.2); as king,
Christ reigns forever to provide for our needs and protect us, and will return
to judge the living and the dead (II.xv.3–5); as priest, Christ reconciles
us to God through his self-offering as a sacrifice, and through his present
intercession for us (II.xv.6). The essence of Christ’s work, however, is spelt out
in ch. xvi, which begins, ‘What we have said so far concerning Christ must
be referred to this one objective: condemned, dead, and lost in ourselves, we
should seek righteousness, liberation, life and salvation in him . . .’ (II.xvi.1).
This long chapter is devoted to ‘earnestly ponder[ing] how he accomplishes
salvation’ (II.xvi.1), returning once more to the opening theme of the
Institutes, and offering a programmatic statement of penal substitution: ‘[n]o
one can descend into himself and seriously consider what he is without
feeling God’s wrath and hostility toward him. Accordingly he must anxiously
seek ways and means to appease God, and this demands a satisfaction. No
common assurance is required, for God’s wrath and curse always lie upon
sinners until they are absolved of guilt. Since he is a righteous Judge, he
does not allow his law to be broken without punishment, but is equipped to
avenge it’ (II.xvi.1). Here, once again, is the idea that sin cannot be ignored,
but demands satisfaction before it may be forgiven.
The first three sections are devoted to clearing away a difficulty that Calvin
perceives, which is of relevance to my discussion: Scripture speaks of God
in his wrath regarding people as cursed, as his enemies until they are saved
through Christ,23 and yet this cannot be the whole truth, or else why would
God have acted in Christ to save in the first place? Calvin’s answer is that God,
to use the trite slogan, hates the sin whilst loving the sinner. ‘All of us . . . have
21 Robert A. Peterson, Calvin and the Atonement (Fearn: Christian Focus Publications, 1983)
suggests that Luther and Zwingli had both developed penal accounts, but quotes H.D.
McDonald’s assertion that ‘it belongs to Calvin to have given the penal substitutionary
doctrine of the atonement a compelling statement’, pp. 88–9.
22 I am quoting the Battles translation, and using the Barth and Niesel edition of the Latin:
John Calvin, The Institutes of the Christian Religion (2 vols.) (ed. John T. McNeill; trans.
Ford Lewis Battles) (London: SCM Press, 1960); Joannis Calvini: Opera Selecta (5 vols.)
Petrus Barth et Guilelmus Niesel (eds.) (Christian Kaiser, tertio edn, 1967–74).
23 Calvin cites Rom. 5:10, Gal. 3:10,13 and Col. 1:21–2. The point is hardly exceptional,
however.
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in ourselves something deserving of God’s hatred . . . [b]ut because the Lord
wills not to lose what is his in us, out of his own kindness he still finds
something to love. However much we may be sinners by our own fault, we
nevertheless remain his creatures . . .’ (II.xvi.3). Scripture speaks powerfully
of God’s hatred and enmity towards the unconverted person to make us
sensible of the true value of God’s gift of salvation in Christ (II.xvi.2), but
the deeper truth is God’s prevenient grace: ‘while we were still sinners, Christ
died for us’.
Two aspects of this discussion are interesting: the echoes of Anselm’s
argument that God in some important sense cannot but act to save, and the
relativising of God’s wrath to the sinner. Here, in the classical account of
penal substitution, the first note is necessarily grace, God’s love towards his
sinful creatures. His wrath burns, it is true, but that is not the basic reality.
Any discussion of penal substitution which asserts that the basic reality is the
wrath of God is a caricature: as Calvin demonstrates, although the tradition
will take this reality with the utmost seriousness, the logic of the position
cannot work if the grace and love of God is not prior.
After disposing of this difficulty, Calvin turns to the way in which Christ
has redeemed us, and offers an exposition of the relevant clauses of the
Apostles’ Creed. His first point (‘born of the virgin Mary’) is to note
that Christ’s whole life of obedience was redemptive, citing the relevant
Scriptures. The only mechanistic comment in this paragraph, however, is the
enigmatic statement ‘from the time when he took on the form of a servant, he
began to pay the price of liberation in order to redeem us’ (II.xvi.5). Calvin
here offers no explanation of how his life is such a payment.24 He then,
following the Creed, moves straight from the fact of Christ’s life to his trial
(‘suffered under Pontius Pilate’). Calvin makes much of this, as a historical
and narrative image of Christ being condemned on our behalf: ‘Scripture
first relates Christ’s condemnation under Pontius Pilate . . . to teach us that
the penalty to which we were subject had been imposed on this righteous
24 Later in the same section he makes the point that ‘no proper sacrifice to God could
have been offered unless Christ . . . subjected and yielded himself wholly to his Father’s
will’. This is true, of course, but makes Christ’s life of obedience a precondition for
paying the penalty, not a part of the payment itself. In II.xii.3 there is a suggestion
that Christ takes Adam’s place and lives the life that Adam should have lived. Again,
however, the redemptive mechanism is not clearly spelt out (check) or, rather, it is: ‘to
take Adam’s place . . . and to pay the penalty that we had deserved . . .’; the mechanism
is penal substitution. Robert Peterson notes that Hans Scholl has advanced the thesis
that Calvin follows Irenaeus’s account of recapitulation, but offers good reasons for
refusing to accept this argument. Peterson, n. 6 on p. 62, citing Scholl, Calvinus Catholicus
(Freiberg: Herder, 1974).
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man’ (III.xvi.5). Calvin expands on this point at length: Christ had to die the
way he did as an image, a prophecy, a type perhaps, of the atonement he was
making as our penal substitute. The section ends ‘This is our acquittal: the
guilt that held us liable for punishment has been transferred to the head of the
Son of God. We must, above all, remember this substitution, lest we tremble
and remain anxious throughout life – as if God’s righteous vengeance, which
the Son of God has taken upon himself, still hung over us’ (III.xvi.5).
Not only the occasion of Christ’s death, but its form is illustrative of this
point, and so in expounding ‘crucified’, Calvin notes that to die on a cross
was to be accursed by God, according to the Deuteronomic law code. Calvin’s
discussion of this point shifts the metaphor slightly, from penalty to sacrifice,
although the two are fairly intertwined through this section. Next follows
‘descended into hell’. Calvin famously interprets the decensus as describing the
sufferings of Christ on the cross. What is not always noted is why Calvin
prefers this interpretation. By teaching that Christ experienced the sufferings
of hell on the cross, Calvin is seeking to insist that the just penalty that has
been declared against sinners was transferred to Christ.25 In interpreting ‘on
the third day he rose again from the dead’, Calvin focuses on the motif of
victory: in discussing Christ’s ascension and heavenly session, the atoning
act of intercession; in Calvin’s creedal narrative soteriology, then, there is
more than just penal substitution, but this model of the atonement plays a
significant part.
On justice and satisfaction
There are several standard complaints about penal substitution, mostly
concerning either the account of God offered or the allegedly inappropriate
visions of justice that the model presupposes. It is variously suggested that
God is not constrained by any demands of justice, and can and does simply
forgive out of love, so there is no need for satisfaction; that penal substitution
pictures an improper separation between Father and Son; that visions of God’s
anger needing propitiation are unworthy; or that in any case for the Father
to punish an innocent substitute in place of the guilty party is fundamentally
unjust. Each of these accusations is serious, in that if any one of them is
true, then it would be fair to say that penal substitutionary accounts obscure,
rather than illuminate, the reality of the cross. Let me look at them in turn,
using the resources I have developed so far.
The first argument begins with an assertion that concepts of justice are
merely inappropriate to God; God can chose to forgive. Kathryn Tanner, for
instance, argues on the basis of ‘the unconditionality of God’s giving’ that
25 This is clear in II.xvi.10.
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‘the cross saves us from the consequences of a debt economy in conflict with
God’s own economy of grace by cancelling it’.26 In liberation-influenced
theologies, the same point is made, with the suggestion that what is needed
is not forgiveness for past sins, but an ardent amendment of life devoted to
siding with the oppressed, not the oppressors. The classical response to such
charges is that of Anselm to Boso, who offered the same point in Cur Deus
Homo I.12. Why can God not simply forgive sin, or, indeed, as Boso offers at
another point, why is a life lived in repentance and service to God – whether
Boso’s offer of devoted monastic asceticism, or the modern offer of living
with the oppressed and fighting for liberation – not sufficient for God to
forgive?
We might begin a response by noting that penal substitution is a metaphor
that operates in the realm of law, and that it is of the essence of law that it
cannot simply be set aside. A short walk from where I live is Runnymede,
and the memorials to the signing of the still-celebrated Magna Carta. It is
still celebrated, because it codifies the revolutionary idea that there are some
things that even kings cannot do: there is a law that is not merely the decree of
fiat of whoever happens to hold sovereignty, but which is somehow, within
the nature of things, binding on all human beings. In modern parlance,
certain people – only, in Magna Carta – have rights that are inalienable:
‘At Runnymede, at Runnymede, your rights were won at Runnymede. No
freeman may be fined or bound, or dispossessed of freehold ground, except
by lawful judgement found, and passed upon him by his peers – forget not,
after all these years the charter signed at Runnymede’, to quote Kipling’s
doggerel summary.27
The penal tradition of talking about the atonement must be understood
as assuming this basic intuition. God cannot just waive the law because it
is the essence of law that it cannot just be waived. The question of how
26 Kathryn Tanner, Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity: A Brief Systematic Theology (Edinburgh: T&T
Clark, 2001), p. 88.
27 Rudyard Kipling, ‘The Reeds of Runnymede’. In passing it is worth noting that this
instinct, that there is an order to which all people, however powerful, are responsible,
which was enshrined in feudal Europe and carried over into the early modern period
(for instance, in the concept of the ‘divine right of kings’ which, for all its flaws, is
a recognition that kings need more authority than their wealth and power can give
them before they can act licitly), is lost in Enlightenment understandings of the state:
Rousseau’s famous ‘social contract’, for instance, is clearly a (rather desperate) attempt
to place limits on the power of the sovereign (or the sovereign state) once belief that
there are external limits has been lost. So is the concept of human rights.
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this might apply to God is not often asked, as far as I can discern,28 but the
theological location of the answer is clear enough: law here clearly operates
as some form of real universal, and the Christian tradition, whilst generally
refusing to deny the existence of universals in its rejection of nominalism,
has equally been unhappy about asserting their independent existence in
full-blown realism. The solution, as I have argued elsewhere,29 is generally
found in the doctrine of divine simplicity, which insists that universals are
partial but accurate descriptions of the ineffable essence of God. On this
reading the law that God cannot set aside is an aspect of his own nature;
for God to set aside the law would be equivalent to God choosing not to be
good; both are inconceivable.30
This argument seems to work, assuming the premise that the law that
demands sin be met with satisfaction is accepted as a perfection of God’s
nature. I assume, therefore, that the criticisms of penal substitution are based
not on an inability to sketch such obvious theological arguments, but on a
denial of this basic premise.31 Rather than attempt a defence here,32 let me
offer another line of response, based on Anselm’s arguments, that I think
demonstrates the need for satisfaction equally well.
On Anselm’s telling, satisfaction is not demanded because of any need or
lack in God. God is perfectly fulfilled – happy, if you will – in his own triune
life, and it would be the height of sinful arrogance and proud presumption
to imagine that the sins of the whole world could dent that perfection in the
least way. Rather, for the creation to be what it was intended to be, it needs
to honour God perfectly – and the same is true of every particular creature.
If God is in fact honoured by monastic observance, or by liberative activity,
then to be utterly devoted to such action is the necessary responsibility of
28 Paul Fiddes is an honourable exception, although his suggestion that law be equated
with the will of God, rather than the being of God is, I think, a misreading of the
tradition. Past Event, pp. 101–2.
29 See my ‘Something Much too Plain to Say: Towards a Defence of the Doctrine of
Divine Simplicity’, Neue Zeitschrift fu¨r Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 43 (2001),
pp. 137–54, reprinted with minor adjustments as ch. 4 of my Listening to the Past.
30 To conceive of them requires a suggestion that God’s will and God’s nature are no
longer aligned, and so a suggestion that God has ceased to be holy (as the identity of
God’s will and God’s nature is a standard definition of holiness). If God could cease to
be holy he would no longer be God, but the most horrible demon. I owe this point
to the Reverend Rufus Burton.
31 If this is the case, however, it is something of a shame that they are not generally
clearer about the point.
32 Although the basic lines of the defence I would offer will become clear later in the
paper.
115
scottish journal of theology
every creature at all moments of its life. Thus, an ardent amendment of the
whole of life, even if perfectly carried out, can only result in no further failure
to honour God; the failure that had already happened remains. The creature
has failed to be what it should be, and so is damaged, and this damage is
irreparable by any creaturely action. Atonement is necessary, not to repair
damage done to God, but to repair the self-harm done by the creature. God,
being a se, cannot be damaged, and so has not been damaged.
Now, I realise of course that many modern critics of penal substitution
would not accept such an account; but this is entirely beside the point; penal
theories were developed by theologians who held to a traditional Christian
doctrine of God, and so the model can only be attacked from within this
tradition. If the complaint is in fact against the doctrine of God, then that is
a different discussion, but to attack penal substitution because it makes no
sense in a thought-world in which it was never intended to make sense is
as idle as complaining about not getting a leg-before-wicket decision on a
baseball diamond.
Even accepting all this, the complaint might be re-phrased: could God not
simply act to make the creature whole by sovereign loving decree without
any need for atonement or satisfaction? Anselm’s arguments, however,
explain why this cannot be: the creature’s identity, established by a narrative
continuity of actions, is what is broken and damaged: God might act to
end that creaturely identity and create a new one out of the ashes, break
the narrative continuity through some radical ending and beginning, a truly
drastic version of being ‘born again’, but that would not be salvation, it would
be destruction and new creation. For salvation to come, there somehow needs
to be a single narrative continuity, a single personal identity, that contains
within it not just the failures but that which re-establishes the creature as
what it should be. In Anselm’s terms, there is a need for satisfaction, for
an element of the narrative through which the creature offers the honour
to God that it needed, and failed, to give. I have already indicated that any
attempt at the amendment of life cannot fulfil this criterion, as, at best, if
perfection is reached it will only result in no more failure being added to
the account. In such terms, the event of penal substitution is not merely a
forensic declaration of the forgiveness of guilt extra nos, it is an event in the
life of each saved person that transforms that life.
So, on such an account there is a need for satisfaction, not because God
somehow demands it, but because the creature cannot be what it was created
to be without it. Unless satisfaction is made, God’s purposes for the creature
would be thwarted. This does not yet establish that penal substitution is
a valid way of making that satisfaction, but it does at least indicate that
somehow it needs to be made. At this point I suppose that the argument
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I would offer to demonstrate the disputable premise in my first defence
of the need for satisfaction is becoming clear: it is now at least plausible
to suggest that God’s faithfulness, goodness and constancy to the creation
establish certain ‘laws’ of action that can be considered to be aspects of his
being, because they are contained within these perfections.
On to the second of my four points, and the argument that penal
substitution is an inadequate picture of what is going on at Calvary because
it necessarily posits an improper separation between Father and Son. The
Father is the angry God who demands blood, the Son the loving Saviour
who offers his own to satiate the bloodlust of his Father. Father and Son are
disunited – opposed even; their will, their intention, their desire and their
attitude are at odds. This is the picture presented by penal substitution, and
it is an improper one.
Let me first acknowledge the force of the complaint: if this were the
picture presented by penal substitution, it would indeed be an improper
one. Orthodox trinitarian theology has always insisted on the utter unity of
the attitudes, actions, desires and intentions of the divine persons. Hence,
John of Damascus: ‘There is . . . one ousia, one goodness, one power, one
will, one energy, one authority; one and identical; not three similar to each
other, but a single identical motion of the three hypostaseis . . .’33 There can
be no room for such division in the Godhead. So any defence must deny the
minor premise, must show that penal substitution does not, in fact, involve
such a separation. Can my readings of Calvin and Anselm offer any help here?
Calvin’s initial discussion of the subject, although devoted to clearing away
a problem, should, I think, be read as programmatic. The great statement of
these three sections is that God – and I think we should read the Father here,
although the point is (necessarily) equally true of the whole Trinity – God’s
fundamental attitude is that he desires his people to be saved. Second to that
is his abhorrence towards that which has put us in danger of perdition in the
first place, our sins, rebellions, and failures. These points are demonstrated
from Scripture at some length. Calvin does not turn to demonstrate that the
Biblical presentation of the attitude of Jesus the Son is precisely the same,
and I have not time to do it here, but I think it is a point sufficiently plausible
to be asserted. That Jesus’ first response is love, mercy, compassion to the
sinner, and that within that is nonetheless an implacable hatred of sin, is an
intuitively plausible reading of the gospels. On Calvin’s account, then, Father
33 Quoted by G. L. Prestige in God in Patristic Thought (London: SPCK, 1952), pp. 263–4.
As Prestige notes, John is quoting Ps.-Cyril at this point. He further argues that this is
a summary of the position held by the Greek Fathers from Origen, citing Athanasius
and the Cappadocians in particular.
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and Son are utterly united, and his doctrine – the classical statement of penal
substitution – is defended on this basis. The second complaint, like the first,
has no substance.
What of God’s anger against sin, often dismissed as a primitive
anthropomorphic conception of deity? Is it the case that God’s hot anger,
God’s wrath burns against sinners, needing to be satisfied before it might be
averted? I hope that some, at least, of the resources to answer this criticism
are already obvious from the expositions of Anselm and Calvin I have offered,
but let me pause for a moment to consider the form of the criticism, before
sketching the defence. Two distinct complaints are generally wrapped up in
this line of critique: can we legitimately describe God as angry, and even if
we can, is it proper to speak of that anger as demanding satisfaction – the
price of blood? Both these criticisms turn on Anselm’s famous question of
how serious a thing sin is. On the one hand, the sustained Biblical witness
to the wrath of God is a witness that God regards sin as something serious.
Not that God is in some pagan way offended or upset by sin – the basic
orthodox condition of aseity still holds – but that God’s anger burns against
all that threatens to warp and destroy the creation he has made to love. It is
in this sense that Barth’s celebrated assertion about God’s wrath being a form
of his love must be taken on board: if God were merely indifferent towards
his world, he would have no reason to be angry at sin. God’s anger is the
anger of an artist who, knowing she has created a masterpiece, sees fools
desecrating it with felt-tip pens; it is the anger of a mother who sees abusers
wounding, warping and destroying her child.34 To suggest that God is not
angry is to suggest that this mother should not be either. God’s anger cannot
logically be denied without a simultaneous denial of God’s love.35
On the other hand, there is the question of satisfaction. I have already
indicated that exegetes are united in insisting the sacrificial system implied a
worldview in which sin demanded satisfaction, and argued that the creature
needs satisfaction to be made for there to be a possibility of its redemption;
the traditional language, however, speaks of the wrath of God being satisfied.
34 This aspect of the traditional doctrine of God has been recaptured by the liberation
theologians, and other contextual theologians, after many years of a liberal theology
that, at its worst, seemed to be devoted to proving that sin is not a problem and that
God is far too nice ever to be angry. The most powerful statement of this theme is
perhaps Robert Beckford, God of the Rahtid: Redeeming Rage (London: DLT, 2001).
35 A previous service book issued by the denomination within which I have the privilege
to minister, the Baptist Union of Great Britain, suggested a form of marriage vows
that included the promise ‘I will love you when I love you and when I hate you.’ The
gloss pointed out that the opposite of love is not hatred, but indifference. The point is
profoundly right, although arguably out of place in a wedding ceremony.
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Can this be defended? It seems to me not only that it can but it must; if
satisfaction is understood as I have described it, as a reordering of the identity
of the creature that is necessary for the creature to be what it was determined
by God to be. On the premise that God’s purposes are omnibenevolent, then
whatever the creature was purposed to be by God is the best thing it can
possibly be; any alternative identity is a falling short on the creature’s part
of what it could be. I have already argued that to speak of God’s anger is to
speak of God’s loving concern that a creature be all that he desires it to be;
if this is the case, and if a creature cannot be that without satisfaction, then
God’s anger demands satisfaction.
Now, this may seem some way from traditional accounts of penal
substitution, but that is not the case. In my exegesis of Anselm I showed
that it was precisely God’s benevolence, his desire for the best for his project
of creation, that meant punishment of sinners was unthinkable, and that
satisfaction for sin would have to be somehow made instead. In reading
Calvin, I pointed out that his first discussion on the atonement concerns
the recognition that the love of God must be the first and basic reality, or
atonement would never have happened. So the classical accounts of penal
substitution have precisely the primary focus on the love and goodness of
God that I have been developing here.
But still, why this satisfaction? Why torture and scorn and mockery and
public spectacle and bloodshed and anguish and the cruellest of deaths?36
Here, Anselm’s account is inadequate: he argues that satisfaction can only be
made by the offering of a gift God could not demand, and that the life of
the sinless God-man was such a gift. But there is nothing in the argument to
explain why a private and painless suicide, the dignified death of Socrates,
would not have sufficed. Calvin’s account is more satisfactory: the public
trial, condemnation and execution of Christ have a purpose: they reveal that
he is standing in our place, being judged and condemned on our behalf.
Again, the agonies he suffers are images of the spiritual agony, the descent
into hell, that he bore for us on the cross, and so must happen for us to
know and understand what he is doing for us. This is a place where Calvin’s
full-blown penal scheme has the advantage on Anselm’s earlier account: the
public shame and agony of Christ make perfect sense if we understand what
is going on as a judicial process. This leads to the final complaint: can, in
fact, this be understood as a judicial process? Can it be just for the sinless
one to be punished on our behalf?
36 Whatever the theological or cinematic merits of Mel Gibson’s recent The Passion of the
Christ, it makes this point at least with considerable power – as does the medieval
Catholic tradition of devotion from which the film so obviously borrows.
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This is perhaps the most lasting complaint. It is suggested that this is
simply not justice. That no court in the world would let a criminal go free if
someone else offered to serve their sentence for them, to be imprisoned on
their behalf, or to be executed in their place. This instinct is, I think, not as
obvious as is sometimes made out: if the court’s punishment is a fine, then
the court will obviously be satisfied if the fine is paid, whether it is paid out
of the criminal’s savings or whether some generous benefactor for reasons
of her own chooses to give the criminal the money to pay. And it is worth
remembering that many penalties were traditionally commutable to fines in
European law, even penalties for murder. We are not, however, talking about
a fine when we come to the atonement; we are talking about an execution. I
have already suggested that Anselm’s attempt to describe the death of Christ
as a gift offered to God is inadequate, in that it does not explain the death
Christ died. Can someone else take my place on the cross?
I suggested that there was a sense in which Anselm’s account was not
straightforwardly substitutionary, in that his account depends on the created
order, albeit focused in one of its members, offering to God the satisfaction,
the honour, that he was due. It seems to me that this intuition might suggest
a way forward: the penal tradition was perhaps most dominant in the
context of a theological scheme, covenant theology, that pictured a very
close connection between Christ and his people. In certain statements of this
theme Christ is deemed (like Adam) to be a ‘corporate personality’ or ‘public
person’; through which some formal identity was postulated between Christ
and the Church, and between Adam and all human beings.37 Such reflections
suggest two questions: could it be any more just for Christ to offer himself in
our place if such a connection exists, and what form might this connection
need to take?
On the first, I think that it is at least possible that this might be the case:
consider the moral imagination that in many cultures has regarded it as just
to punish a wife for her husband’s actions, a father for his children’s, and so
on much more widely through the family circle. This is not the way people in
the West tend to conceive of morality, rather imagining ourselves as utterly
individual agents whose choices are not affected by others, and who are
thus not responsible for the choices of others. But we have surely learnt by
now that the first part of that is merely a fiction, that it is of the essence
37 William Ames asserts ‘it is the church of Christ because it is united to Christ . . . the
elect . . . are grafted into Christ’ (Marrow of Theology, trans. and ed. John D. Eusden
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1997), p. 175. For an extended and powerful statement of
this theme, see John Gill, A Body of Doctrinal Divinity (London, 1795), Book 2, ch. IV. Gill
quotes several earlier writers, and many other examples could be offered.
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of personal agency not to be utterly individual, and so that our choices are
necessarily affected by others. Given this, is the widespread intuition that
we can be held responsible for the actions of those to whom we are closest,
not at least worthy of consideration? And if we begin to imagine this, is not
penal substitution more comprehensible?
I offer these analogies in the hope that they make the underlying logic
of penal substitution, that one person may in fact bear another’s penalty,
less totally unimaginable. I realise, of course, that all this is not enough; but
so did the tradition that taught penal substitution at various points in its
history. In later Reformed thought, there is a concerted attempt to offer a
theological logic whereby Christ and the Church can be treated as a single
moral agent. Two versions of this were common: offering a federal account of
the union, or offering a realist account.38 I have already noted that Anselm’s
logic moves in these directions, positing an action which restores the moral
status of the created order through one of its members, the God-man, Jesus
of Nazareth. However, this is not a penal account, and so inadequate to my
present purposes.
The federal tradition, or covenant theology, argues in effect for a ‘legal
fiction’ decreed by God (although, of course, nothing decreed by God can be
rightly considered a fiction). On this account, God so establishes the natural
order that all human beings will be held accountable for the moral actions of
Adam, and all members of the Church will be jointly accountable with the
head of the Church, Christ. So the sin of Adam is justly imputed to all other
human beings, but Christ’s bearing of the penalty is sufficient satisfaction
for the guilt of the members of his Church. The realist tradition attempts
to demonstrate that this is no legal fiction, but a state of affairs which is a
necessary result of the relationships that obtain within the world. I have given
an account of Jonathan Edwards’s doctrine of original sin elsewhere,39 which
works on these terms: Edwards effectively offers a philosophical argument
that, if it is correct, establishes that Adam’s actions are as much mine as my
own are, and that my actions are as much Christ’s as they are mine. He does
this through a theological account of identity which I suspect does not work,
but that is beside the point in a sense: the failure of one particular argument
does not demonstrate that the position is unsustainable, and so it remains
possible that such an account might work.
38 I have been helped on this point by a paper written by one of my doctoral students,
the Reverend Wilfred Ho Wai Tat.
39 See my God of Grace and God of Glory: An Account of the Theology of Jonathan Edwards (Edinburgh:
T&T Clark, 2000), pp. 227–31.
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Finally, however, on this point, it is worth asking why did Calvin not
even worry about the question of whether one person could be punished
on behalf of another: his account depends on this position, and yet he does
not address it as an issue. I think there are two elements to why this is the
case: first, I am sure that the problem was not so sharp for Calvin, in that he
was not hung up on modern individualistic and atomistic accounts of ethics
which insist as a primary position that my actions are mine and mine alone;40
second, I suspect that Calvin’s account is driven by an exegetical logic which
makes this a non-problem: Calvin believes that one of the ways the Scriptures
illuminate the work of Jesus is through an account of substitutionary guilt
bearing: this is the logic behind the entire sacrificial system, apart from
anything else. Given this, the question of whether a substitute can in fact
bear another’s guilt is not an issue: in God’s economy, this happens, so it
must be possible for it to happen.
Conclusion
So, I have sought to sketch how an argument for the continued relevance
of the tradition of penal substitution might proceed. I suppose the final
question is, why bother? Is there any merit in rescuing this tradition? Let me
in conclusion briefly mention three reasons:
First, I have already suggested that a large part of the hymnody, liturgy
and devotional writing of Reformed and Evangelical Christianity has stressed
penal language in its discussion of the atonement. If the only result of a
defence of penal substitution is that this material remains available to us,
then that already means the argument is worth making.
Second, in sketching an account of how we should develop an atonement
theology, I have suggested, albeit briefly, that each additional model or
metaphor we are able to deploy enlarges our understanding of what was
done for our salvation at Calvary. If this is the case, then to demonstrate that
a model that has been widely rejected as misleading or inaccurate is in fact
useful is a theological advance.
Third, and most importantly, however, it seems to me that penal metaphors
are important because they take the reality of sin seriously. Typically, modern
accounts of the atonement are tinged by liberation theology, and suggest
that the essence of sin is some form of oppression, and that Christ’s bearing
of the ultimate in oppression on the cross, and his victory over that, is
God’s decisive act of rejection of all oppression. On this basis, the cross
speaks liberation to the oppressed, and judgement on the oppressors. The
40 Calvin demonstrates that the concomitant to this, a libertarian view of freedom, is
incoherent. Inst. II.2–5.
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account given of repentance is a turning from being an oppressor to side
with the oppressed, and so a participation in God’s liberative action. Such
recognitions are important, but they ignore Anselm’s great insight: half a
lifetime of oppression, of rebellion against God, cannot be simply forgotten,
as I have argued, both exegetically and theologically, at some length earlier.
A key element of penal substitution is language of acts of transgression –
crimes – and the guilt they bring, which must be dealt with. Thus, penal
substitution is a way of talking that speaks of the cross to the oppressors,
to those who damage and kill. It speaks a word of deep criticism – Barth’s
insight that only the cross shows us just how abhorrent our actions are – a
word of decisive judgement that is still, nonetheless, a word of hope, of life
beyond judgement.
In the gospel accounts of the crucifixion, there are two moments of
individual salvation. One is the penitent thief, who, whatever his crimes,
is one of the oppressed, victimised by the cruel Roman occupiers. Modern
accounts of atonement can make sense of his deliverance. The other, however,
is the centurion in Mark, the oppressor, the invader who persecutes the thief –
and who persecutes Jesus, the blameless Son of God. Penal substitution is, I
suggest, a way of making sense of this moment of salvation.
Historically, penal accounts arise within the activist spirituality of
Reformation and Evangelical traditions, and flourish amongst the Christian
traditions of colonial Europe. As such, they were perhaps an appropriate
theology of the cross for their day, speaking radical critique and judgement
on the actions of European oppressors, and announcing that no outrage,
however much it was hidden by further exercises of power, would have its
guilt covered over and forgotten. This was a deeply prophetic theology – but
beyond that word of judgement was also a word of hope, a promise that
the foulest oppressor might be liberated from the crushing guilt of his or
her misdeeds and provided a place with the poor and the oppressed at the
Messianic feast. Penal metaphors matter, finally, because they teach us just
how serious our plight was, and so just how much God has graciously done
in Jesus. To return once more to Bliss’s great hymn, ‘Guilty, vile and helpless
we; spotless Lamb of God was he; full atonement – can it be? Allelujah! What
a Saviour!’
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